We use newly-available census microdata from IPUMS-International to assess trends in intergenerational coresidence in 15 developing countries. Contrary to expectations, we find no general decline in intergenerational coresidence over the past several decades. There have been, however, significant changes in the configuration of intergenerational coresidence. Families in which the older generation is household head-a configuration consistent with traditional patriarchal forms in which the older generation retains authority-are becoming more common in most of the countries. Intergenerational families headed by the younger generation-the configuration one would expect if intergenerational coresidence were motivated by a need for old-age support-are on the decline in most of the countries. Multivariate analysis reveals that intergenerational families headed by the older generation are positively associated with measures of economic development. These findings are at variance with widely-accepted social theory. We hypothesize that housing shortage, economic stress in the younger generation, and old-age pensions may contribute to the change. More broadly, in some developing countries rising incomes may have allowed more people to achieve their preferred family structure of intergenerational coresidence following traditional family forms.
Intergenerational Coresidence in Developing Countries
A sizeable literature suggests that coresidence of elderly persons with their children is on the decline in most developing countries. These studies draw on a long tradition of theories that postulate an inverse association of household complexity and economic development. This analysis uses new data and measures to assess changes in intergenerational coresidence in 15 developing countries.
We have three main objectives. First, we measure trends in intergenerational coresidence in developing countries from the perspective of both the younger generation and the older generation. Second, we assess trends in intergenerational coresidence by headship patterns.
Finally, we carry out multivariate analyses to control for changes in population composition and assess the relationship of intergenerational coresidence to economic development.
The results indicate that there are no clear trends in intergenerational coresidence over the past several decades. In some countries, there were modest increases in coresidence; in other countries, there were modest declines. Even more intriguing, when we focus on intergenerational families headed by the older generation-the family configuration most closely associated with traditional stem-family and joint-family systems-we find significant increases in all but two of the countries examined. This suggests that traditional family forms are stable or increasing across much of the developing world. Moreover, multivariate analyses reveal that key measures of economic development are positively associated with intergenerational families headed by the older generation.
Theories of Coresidence and Development
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Frédéric Le Play proposed that economic development was contributing to a decline of intergenerational coresidence. Traditionally, Le Play argued, generations had been bound together by property. The younger generation remained in the ancestral home, providing labor as the family patriarch grew old and eventually inheriting the farm. With commercial and industrial growth in the nineteenth century, fewer families had property to hand down. As a consequence, Le Play contended, more and more of the aged began to reside separately from their children (Le Play 1884:3-28) .
The idea that economic development is associated with simplification of the family and independent residence of the aged became widely accepted in the twentieth century. Midtwentieth-century sociological literature highlighted the connection between industrialization and nuclear family structure (e.g., Parsons 1949; Nimkoff 1962) . Intergenerational coresidence, it was said, was undermined by growing wage labor opportunities, which provided incentives for the younger generation to leave the farm and move to urban areas. Moreover, many theorists argued, small nuclear families were best adapted to urban societies with high geographic and social mobility (Wirth 1938; Parsons and Bales 1955; Burgess 1960) .
By the 1960s, theorists began to argue that the processes of family change were occurring worldwide, and that ultimately nuclear families would prevail everywhere. Goode (1963) , the most prominent advocate of this convergence theory, argued that although there is considerable variation in family systems across different societies, eventually the nuclear family will predominate worldwide. Wherever the economic system expands through industrialization, family patterns change. Extended kinship ties weaken, lineage patterns dissolve, and a trend toward some form of the conjugal system generally begins to appear -that is, the nuclear family becomes a more independent kinship unit (Goode 1963: 6) .
Most of the literature on this issue during the past four decades assumes that intergenerational coresidence is common in traditional agricultural societies and diminishes with industrialization, migration, and economic expansion (e.g. Burch 1967; Blumberg & Winch 1972; Cowgill 1986; Martin 1989; De Vos 1990; Mason 1992; McDonald 1993; Aykan and Wolf 2000; Bongaarts and Zimmer 2002) . The views of these authors vary. They do not always see themselves as followers of the tradition that runs from Le Play to Goode. In many instances, analysts stress the importance of persistent cultural norms and focus on the costs and benefits of coresidence for each generation (e.g. Knodel and Chayoven 1997) . Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that intergenerational coresidence is declining in most countries in the face of economic development. A minority of theorists, however, stress the cultural indelibility of family systems and suggest that traditional family forms are fundamental cultural structures that remain resilient to change (Huntington 1996 , Therborn 2004 Kamo and Zhou 1994) .
The patrilineal joint-family and stem-family systems described by Le Play and subsequent family theorists assume that wealth, property, and power are concentrated in the hands of older generation men (Le Play 1884; Goldschmidt and Kunkel 1971; Berkner 1972; Mason 1992; Ruggles 1994) . In such traditional families, the younger generation is dependent on the older generation, relying on elders for housing, employment, and the prospect of eventual inheritance. Much of the literature on living arrangements of the aged in developing countries, by contrast, is motivated by concern about maintaining old-age support as populations age and family structure simplifies (e.g. Mason 1992; Chan 1997; Chen 1996; Knodel and Chayovan 1997; Natividad and Cruz 1997; Hermalin 2002) . Many researchers implicitly or explicitly assume that elderly coresident parents in developing countries are typically dependent on their children both for economic support and care (e.g. Bongaarts and Zimmer 2002; Clay and Vander Haar 1993; Knodel and Debavalya 1997; cf. Schröder-Butterfill 2004) .
Which generation is dependent has important theoretical implications for the impact of economic development on the frequency of intergenerational coresidence. In particular, if the younger generation has expanded economic opportunities, we would expect a reduced frequency of coresidence in traditional patriarchal multigenerational families, since the alternatives to familial employment would become more attractive. At the same time, however, the rise of wage labor could contribute to an increase of landless elderly with no means of support, and increasing income of younger generation wage earners could actually increase their capacity to take in destitute parents. Thus, all things being equal, one would expect rising economic opportunity for the young to discourage traditional patriarchal coresidence, but perhaps to encourage coresidence associated with old-age support.
Demographic Change and Intergenerational Coresidence
Many studies of intergenerational relations in the developing world are motivated by the implications of demographic change for old-age dependency ratios (Martin and Kinsella 1994; Zimmer and Kwong 2003; Knodel and Chayovan 1997; Chan 1997) . Declining fertility and mortality is leading to aging of the population in almost every country of the world. An older population means that most countries will see growing numbers of elderly dependents with stagnant or even declining numbers of working-age adults available to provide support.
The implications of demographic change for intergenerational coresidence are not, however, confined to dependency ratios. Demographers have frequently observed that changing demographic conditions have a direct impact on the availability of kin for intergenerational coresidence (e.g., Levy 1965; Burch 1967; Kobrin 1976; Ruggles 1994; Uhlenberg 1996; Schoeni 1998) . The effects of demographic change vary dramatically depending on the perspective of the observer. In particular, the effect of declining fertility and mortality on intergenerational coresidence is different for the younger generation and the older generation.
For the younger generation, ongoing demographic changes increase the opportunities to reside with parents. Mortality decline increases the chances that an adult will have a surviving parent. Fertility decline, however, is even more important. A smaller group of adult children for each aged parent increases the chances that any particular child will coreside. If the parent has a farm and the coresident child will inherit, fewer siblings mean less competition. If the elderly parent is destitute and needs to move in with a child for care, fewer siblings means increased responsibility. Ruggles (1994) estimates that the number of surviving parents per 100 adults age 40-44 increased four-fold in the United States between 1880 and 1980. The same kinds of demographic changes that took place in the United States between 1880 and 1980 are now taking place in many developing countries. Thus, from the perspective of the younger generation, current demographic changes in developing countries are substantially increasing the potential for intergenerational coresidence.
The impact of demographic change on the potential for coresidence is the opposite for the older generation. Fertility decline means that the aged have fewer children with whom they can reside. Mortality decline increases the survival of children to adulthood, but this effect is generally small relative to the drop in births. All things being equal, one would expect that a drop in the number of available children would reduce the potential for coresidence, but there is some evidence that the impact is relatively small. In populations where coresidence of the aged is the norm, it appears to be relatively insensitive to additional numbers of surviving children (Knodel et al. 2000; Smith 1986; Ruggles 1994 ; see also Elman and Uhlenberg 1995) .
In sum, if the propensity to coreside remained constant, we would expect fertility and mortality decline to lead to a substantial rise in the proportion of adults residing with parents.
Such demographic change could also lead to a decline in the proportion of elderly persons residing with children, but we would expect this effect to be comparatively small.
Empirical Findings of Past Research
Intergenerational coresidence has declined dramatically in every Western industrial country for which we have historical and contemporary data (e.g., Alter, Cliggett and Urbiel 1996; Andorka 1995; Dillon 1997; Guinnane 1996; Fauve-Chamoux 1996; Pampel 1992; Wall 1995; Ruggles 2007; Tomassini et al. 2004; United Nations 2005) . There is also clear evidence of decline in coresidence in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the most developed East Asian countries (Martin 1990; Hirosima 1997; Hermalin, Ofstedal and Chang, 1992; De Vos and Lee, 1993; Knodel and Debavalya 1997; Chattopadhyay and Marsh 1999; Yang 1999) .
For less developed countries, however, direct evidence of change in residence patterns is surprisingly scarce. Most studies of intergenerational coresidence in developing countries examine a single point in time, sometimes inferring chronological change indirectly by comparing countries at different levels of economic development (e.g. Bongaarts 2001; Bongaarts and Zimmer 2002) . Some studies of developing Asian countries have suggested that there has so far been little change in coresidence (Logan, Bian, and Bian 1998; Palloni 2001; Knodel and Ofstedal 2002) . The most comprehensive analysis is the United Nations' Living Arrangements of Older Persons Around the World (New York, 2005) . Based on analysis of data from 33 developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the study concludes:
Considering the whole group of countries, there is a trend towards independent forms of living arrangements-alone or with spouse only-at the expense of co-residential forms of arrangements, especially those with children and other relatives (United Nations 2005: 49) .
This result, however, could be an artifact of fertility decline. The United Nations analysis uses an age threshold of 60, and the measure of residence with children has no age control. Husbands tend to be a few years older than their wives in most countries, so when husbands reach the age of 60, their wives are in their 50s. In populations with minimal fertility limitation, women typically bear their last child around the age of 40 or higher. In such populations a substantial proportion of persons aged 60 or older still have a minor child present in the household. As women begin to limit their fertility, their age at the birth of their last child declines (Knodel 1977) . Accordingly, the proportion of aged persons who have minor children will also go down.
This effect is often compounded by a declining age gap between husbands and wives, which also reduces the frequency of elderly men with minor children (Lloyd 2005: 447) . Thus, the findings of the United Nations study may reflect, in part, the effects of the dramatic declines in fertility and reduction in the age gap between husbands and wives that have taken place in most of the developing world. There are two major liabilities to these data, however. First, the chronological depth is limited; in most countries, the available surveys span less than a decade. Second, sample sizes are limited, especially for the earlier DHS samples; the surveys taken before the mid-1990s usually have between 3,000 to 9,000 cases altogether, and they often have just 150 to 300 respondents aged 65 or older.
Data and Measures of Coresidence
To adequately assess change in the living arrangements of the aged across the developing world, we need large samples spanning multiple decades for multiple diverse countries. We turn We focused on developing countries-defined as low and middle income economies in the World Bank (2007) classification-with at least two available census years. These restrictions left us with data from 42 censuses of 15 countries, as described in Table 1 . 1 The samples are large; most cover 10% of the population. In general, methodology and question wording is comparable from census to census. One key difference, however, is that many censuses employ a de facto enumeration rule, which includes in each household only those persons present on census day, but others adopt a de jure standard, which counts everyone at their usual residence. One might expect the de facto rule to produce lower estimates of coresidence; such enumerations can miss members of the younger generation temporarily absent for work or to attend school. Conversely, de jure enumerations sometimes count kin as 1 The 2001 census of Ecuador was excluded from the analysis because of a problem with the family relationship variable. coresident when they are merely visiting. We expect that the net effect of variation in enumeration rule is small.
The fourteen developing countries with available census microdata are not representative of the developing world as a whole. We have data for eight Latin American countries, four African countries, and just two Asian countries. Most of the world's population resides in Asia, and intergenerational coresidence is particularly high in that region. Accordingly, we cannot generalize about trends and differentials in the developing world as a whole; our results apply only to the fourteen countries for which we have data.
Our measures of intergenerational coresidence, summarized in Table 2 , are modeled on those used by Ruggles (2007) . They are significantly more restrictive than the measures used in most studies of intergenerational coresidence in developing countries. Most of these studies assess the percent of persons age 60 or older residing with a child. As noted, we are concerned that this measure risks conflating changes in fertility patterns with changes in residence decisions. In many cases, persons in their early 60s in populations that do not deliberately limit fertility may have children who are still too young to leave home. Accordingly, we focus on persons age 65 or older, since the great majority of their children would be old enough to leave home. In addition, families are considered intergenerational only if the younger generation is age 18 or older.
We also measure intergenerational coresidence from the perspective of the younger generation. Many investigators have observed that coresidence is determined as much-or more-by the younger generation as by the older generation (Aquilino 1990; Crimmins and Ingegneri 1990; Kotlikoff and Morris 1990; Ward et al. 1992; Choi 2003; Ruggles 2007;  VanWey and Cebulko 2007; cf. Moehling 1995) . We define the younger generation as 30 to 39 because those ages are beyond the usual ages of leaving home in all countries and yet are young enough that at least half of the persons in every country would still have a surviving parent with whom they could potentially reside (Uhlenberg 1996) .
We subdivide intergenerational families into two categories, depending on which generation heads the household. As noted, under the traditional model of stem and joint families first described by Le Play, the older generation-especially the men-usually retain power and authority until advanced ages, usually though control over property. Many recent investigators, however, regard intergenerational coresidence chiefly as a means of old age support and assume that parents move into their children's households, often helping with childcare and housework in exchange for economic support. We suggest that headship patterns may help us to distinguish between these two types of families.
Census enumeration instructions suggest that household headship is intended as an indicator of authority within the family. The census instructions do not, for the most part, give a precise definition of headship, but 34 of the censuses we used do provide some guidance to enumerators; these instructions are reproduced in Appendix A. The instructions generally assume that every household has a head and that there is little ambiguity about who that person is. They typically ask respondents to identify the person "recognized" as head or the person "responsible." Sometimes the instructions explicitly identify the head as the person with most authority or the main decision-maker. When there is doubt about which person should be considered head, the instructions sometimes suggest other criteria, such as economic contribution or age.
It is likely that the meaning of headship varies across countries. In some countries, perhaps, age is the most important determinant of headship; in other countries, gender or economic power might be more important. Moreover, headship could be affected by which person responds to the census taker. Even within countries, there may be a range of factors that influence which generation is labeled the household head.
Despite these caveats, we postulate that headship is often correlated with authority within the household (cf. Smith 1992; Ruggles and Brower 2003) . Accordingly, we divide intergenerational families into two types: Elder-head families are defined as those headed by the older generation, and younger-head families are defined as families headed by the younger generation. We do not mean to imply that headship is a definitive indicator of authority or dependence; we do believe, however, that in elder-head families the older generation typically retains more authority than in younger-head families. Moreover, we hypothesize that elder-head families are often stem or joint families, whereas younger-head families are more often formed when a destitute or infirm elderly parent moves into a child's household for support. Figure 1 shows the overall trends in coresidence in fifteen countries for each generation. Panel A shows the percent of the younger generation-persons age 30 to 39-residing with at least one parent, and Panel B shows the percent of older generation-age 65 and older-residing with at least one child age 18 or older. The graphs give a visual summary of the entire group of countries; for trends in specific countries, the data are reproduced in tabular form in Appendix B.
Trends in Intergenerational Coresidence
In 10 of the 15 countries, the percent of the younger generation residing with their parents is on the rise. The exceptions to this pattern are three African countries (Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda), along with Ecuador and Vietnam. As described earlier, in countries with declining fertility and mortality there would be increased opportunity for the younger generation to reside with parents; therefore, ceteris paribus, the demographic changes of most developing countries during the past four decades would tend to favor residence with parents.
When we turn to the living arrangements of the older generation, it is difficult to distinguish clear trends. In six countries (Colombia, Mexico, Romania, South Africa, Venezuela, and Vietnam), intergenerational coresidence of the older generation is increasing, and, in four countries, it is declining (Argentina, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda). In the remaining six countries, there have been small fluctuations but no clear trend in coresidence of the aged.
The period from the 1970s to the 2000s saw substantial demographic change and economic development across much of the developing world. Because the living arrangements of the older generation are less sensitive to changing demographic conditions than are the living arrangements of the younger generation, we believe Panel B provides the best measure of trends in residential preferences during this period of rapid demographic change. Given the rapid pace of economic development in many developing countries, the predominant theories of family change predict declining coresidence. Of the four countries that did see a decline in coresidence, however, two (Rwanda and Kenya) actually had a decline in GDP per capita, and a third, Argentina, had great economic instability and no net per capita economic growth for most of the period examined. Thus, the data on overall trends in family composition provides no evidence to support the theory of a decline in intergenerational coresidence linked to economic development. The trends are just the opposite for the younger-head families. In every country, youngerhead families are less common than elder-head families, and the differential is growing. Among the younger generation (Panel A), the frequency of younger-head families is increasing in South Africa and flat in Mexico but declining in every other country. Measured from the older generation (Panel B), younger-head intergenerational coresidence is going down in 12 countries and increasing in Mexico, South Africa, and Vietnam.
With a few exceptions-especially in Africa-we can broadly generalize about trends in intergenerational coresidence. Intergenerational families headed by the older generation-the form of coresidence we associate with traditional stem-family and joint-family systems-are becoming more common in most of the developing countries examined.
Recent scholarship on intergenerational coresidence in developing countries has highlighted the role of gender and marital status. In particular, researchers stress that the status and authority of the older generation within the family is contingent on gender, and, for women, on the survival of their spouse (e.g. Knodel and Ofstedal 2002; Yount 2005) . Despite the clear importance of gender, however, the same basic trends in coresidence are found among elders of both sexes. We conducted additional analyses (not shown) and found that the rise in intergenerational coresidence of elders was broadly similar for unmarried men, unmarried women, and married couples.
Intergenerational families headed by the younger generation-the configuration, we hypothesize, most likely to signal old-age support-are, with a few exceptions, on the decline.
These trends are precisely the opposite of what one would expect if economic development undermines traditional family forms and creates a new need for old-age support.
Multivariate Analysis
To describe the relationships between individual-level characteristics, indicators of economic development, and trends in intergenerational coresidence, we turn to a fixed-effects multinomial logit regression. 2 We estimate models of intergenerational coresidence for both the younger generation and the older generation, since the needs and resources of both generations can determine coresidence (Ruggles 2007) . We use a model that compares younger-head coresidence and elder-head coresidence with non-intergenerational families (any other family type). We do not have sufficient information consistently available in the censuses to develop formal causal models of coresidence. Rather, our goal is to summarize and describe broad trends and differentials across fourteen countries, using the regression to control for variations in basic demographic characteristics and economic development indicators. Table 3 describes the independent variables included in the analysis. We divide the censuses into four decades; because some countries hold their decennial censuses in the year before the decade change, we divide the decades [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] , and so on. Country-level fixed-effects variables allow us to control for variations across decades in the availability of census information. The Philippines and Rwanda lack key variables needed for the analysis, so we excluded those countries. 3 We include basic demographic characteristics-age, sex, and marital status-to control for the effects of compositional change.
The analysis includes two socioeconomic variables: educational attainment and employment status. Educational attainment is included as an indicator of socioeconomic status and earning potential. Employment status is an indicator of resources. We do not include employment status for the aged population; those with the most resources are among the most likely to retire, and this makes employment of elders difficult to interpret.
We include three country-level measures of economic and demographic conditions: gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars, life expectancy at birth, and percent of the population living in an urban area. 4 The available data on urban residence are highly problematic. Each country defines urban residence differently. Urban residence is sometimes based on a population threshold, ranging from 1,000 persons in Venezuela to 5,000 persons in Uganda. In other instances, urban places are distinguished by unspecified indicators of urban character (Philippines) or availability of urban services (Chile), or they are "administratively determined" according to unspecified criteria (Rwanda). In Ecuador, urban places are defined simply as the capitals of provinces or cantons. Because of the wide variation in definitions, we are uneasy about comparing urban residence across countries. Urbanization is so theoretically important, however, that we felt that we should not ignore it. Accordingly, we have included in the models the percent of the population identified by each country as urban, as reported to the United Nations. 5
The results are presented in the form of odds ratios. Table 4 presents results for the younger generation, and Table 5 shows the older generation. In each table, the dependent variable is family type where family type is defined as living in a younger-head intergenerational family, elder-head intergenerational family, or living in any other family type. In all regressions, living in any other family type is the excluded category.
The characteristics of persons residing in younger-head families differ substantially from those of elder-head families. For example, as shown in Table 4 , models 1 and 2, youngergeneration residence in younger-head intergenerational families is associated with being female, older, and widowed or unmarried. By contrast, residing in elder-head intergenerational families is associated with being male, younger, and separated/divorced or unmarried. As one would expect, members of the younger generation who head intergenerational families tend to be employed, whereas those living in households headed by the parent tend to be unemployed or out of the labor force.
The impact of education on coresidence is more complex. In models 1 and 2, intergenerational coresidence is positively associated with education, but the effect is considerably stronger for elder-head coresidence than for younger-head coresidence. If education is a proxy for economic resources, one might expect to find a stronger effect on younger-head 5 The Minnesota Population Center intends to develop measures of urbanization that are more internationally compatible. When that work is complete, it will allow us to compare intergenerational coresidence in urban and rural areas across countries. coresidence, since the members of the younger generation with the most resources would be best positioned to support dependent elderly parents. The meaning of education, however, may not be so straightforward. Although education of the younger generation is doubtless correlated with economic resources, it may reflect the resources of the elderly parents just as much as those of the younger generation. Parents who could afford to send their children to secondary school probably had substantial economic security. Such parents might also be likely to support dependent children later in life. In this light, the strong positive correlation of education to elderhead coresidence may make sense.
The three country-level measures of economic development have mixed effects on the coresidence of the younger generation with parents. Percent living in an urban area has little effect on younger-head coresidence, but encourages older-head coresidence. It could affect coresidence in two distinct ways. If the younger generation is attracted to jobs in the city and moves off the farm, this could directly reduce intergenerational coresidence. Moreover, compared with rural farmers, fewer urban elders can offer occupational succession to their children. Conversely, however, the rapid growth of cities has led to widespread housing shortages throughout the developing world, which may contribute to doubling up.
The other country-level measures-GDP per capita and life expectancy at birth-are inversely associated with younger-head families and positively associated with elder-head families. These relationships directly contradict our expectations that economic development would discourage residence in traditional patriarchal families but could create new needs and resources for old-age support. 6 In the models that do not control for economic development, the regressions suggest trends in coresidence similar to those shown in Figures 1 and 2 The results for the older generation are given in Table 5 . For the older generation, residence in a family headed by an adult child is strongly associated with being female, older, and divorced, separated or widowed. Residence in an intergenerational family headed by the older generation is most often found among elders who are male, younger, and married or widowed. Educational attainment of the older generation is inversely associated with both categories of intergenerational coresidence. Once again, however, it may oversimplify to assume that the educational results mean that coresidence results from economic need. Educated elders may be more integrated into the urban wage-based economy, which could mean that they have accumulated savings that allow them to live independently. At the same time, however, they may tend to lack the landholdings that form the basis of traditional stem and joint family coresidence.
Among the older generation, percent living in an urban area is modestly associated with younger-head coresidence and has no effect on older-head coresidence. The other measures of 6 Because life expectancy has a direct impact on the survival of parents, one would expect ceteris paribus that it would be positively associated with coresidence, so the inverse relationship of life expectancy to younger-headed coresidence is especially striking. coresidence show the same patterns as among the younger generation: GDP per capita and life expectancy are inversely associated with younger-head coresidence and positively associated with older-head coresidence.
Trends in coresidence are best measured from the perspective of the older generation; as explained above, coresidence of the younger generation is highly sensitive to declines in fertility and mortality. When we control for changes in the composition of the population and the three measures of economic development, the chronological trends are essentially consistent with the basic descriptive statistics presented in Figure 2 : younger-head coresidence has been going down since the 1980s, and elder-head coresidence has been going up since the 1970s.
Discussion
The census data yield several unexpected results. We observed no general decline in intergenerational coresidence in developing countries. Most of the 15 countries examined show an increase in intergenerational coresidence or no clear trend. Four of the 15 countries examined did show declining coresidence of the aged with adult children, but they were not countries with substantial economic development over the period studied. When we turn to the configuration of intergenerational coresidence, the results are even more surprising. Families in which the older generation was household head-which we term elder-head intergenerational families-were much more common than were families headed by the younger generation in every country examined. Such a configuration is consistent with traditional patriarchal forms in which the older generation retains authority. Contrary to expectations, these elder-head intergenerational families are becoming more common in most of the countries. Younger-head families-the configuration one would expect if intergenerational coresidence were motivated by a need for old-age support-are on the decline in most of the countries. The shift from younger-head to elder-head families appears most rapid in the countries with the most rapid economic growth.
Our multivariate analyses reinforce the conclusion that economic development is positively associated with elder-head intergenerational coresidence. GDP per capita and life expectancy were strongly associated with residence in an elder-head intergenerational family, but inversely associated with residence in a younger-head family. A third measure of development, percent living in an urban area, is positively related to elder-head coresidence among the younger generation.
These results should be interpreted cautiously. We examined only two countries in Asia, which is not only the most populous part of the world but also has the highest levels of intergenerational coresidence. We examined only four countries in Africa, and three of them are located in the same part of sub-Saharan East Africa, and probably are not representative of the continent as a whole. Despite these caveats, however, the rise of elder-head intergenerational coresidence and decline of younger-head coresidence is so widespread across the countries we examined that we suspect these trends are occurring through much of the developing world.
Why is elder-head intergenerational coresidence increasing in developing countries, and why is it strongly associated with economic growth? Part of the answer lies with housing shortage. The population of the countries examined here has more than doubled since the 1960s, and new housing construction has not kept pace with demand. Even when elders can no longer provide the prospect of agricultural inheritance, they often can offer a place to live. In many developing countries, there appears to be a significant positive relationship between intergenerational coresidence and the proportion of the population living in an urban area, despite the greater importance of agricultural inheritance in rural areas (Martin 1989; Logan, Bian, and Bian 1988; De Vos and Lee 1993; Chamratrithirong, Morgan, and Rindfuss 1998; Andrade and De Vos 2002) . As shown in Table 4 , percent living in an urban area is clearly associated with persons in their thirties residing in a household headed by their parents, and housing shortages probably contribute to this.
Other changes related to economic development may also encourage coresidence. With rising female labor-force participation in many countries, the demand for services that can be provided by elders-such as grandchild care and housework-may be on the rise in some areas (e.g. Morgan and Hirosima 1983; Chamratrithirong, Morgan, and Rindfuss 1998; Hirschman and Minh 2002; Sasaki 2002 ; for contrasting evidence, see Logan, Bian, and Bian 1988) . Some developing countries have seen unstable or declining employment prospects for youth despite significant economic growth, and some have introduced pension programs for the aged; both of these factors may encourage the younger generation to remain in their parental homes after reaching adulthood (Keller 2004; Camarano 2002; De Vos and Andrade 2005; Duryea, Jaramillo, and Pagés 2003) More broadly, it is possible that rising incomes-especially among the older generation-have allowed more people to achieve their preferred family structure. Goode (1963: 17) observed that "the lower strata in most societies live in small households." Under the classic patriarchal model, stem and joint families are based on agricultural inheritance; if the older generation lacks sufficient land to support the next generation, it may be impossible for the younger generation to stay in the household. Historical studies of preindustrial Western families have found that intergenerational coresidence was strongly positively associated with economic resources (e.g. Berkner 1975; Ruggles 2003) . Some investigations of less-developed countries have also found that intergenerational coresidence is most common among property owners and other elderly with comparatively high socioeconomic status (Martin 1989; Chan and DaVanzo 1996; Agree 1993) . Thus, intergenerational coresidence may be preferred by both generations, but may not be feasible for economic reasons (Milagros et al. 1995) . The strong positive association between economic development and intergenerational coresidence therefore makes some sense: with rising incomes, more people may be able to achieve their preferred family form.
This interpretation suggests that the ideal family form may not have changed greatly but that economic growth has increased the opportunities for intergenerational coresidence. This does not mean, however, that family values are indelible; we have seen dramatic declines in coresidence in every Western country, and there is strong evidence of a similar change in the most developed countries of East Asia. The positive relationship we find between coresidence and development may eventually reverse, and the world may converge towards a conjugal family system just as Goode predicted. As yet, however, there is little sign that such convergence is taking place. 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Percent Costa Rica 2000 The head (gender emphasized) is the person considered as such by the rest of the members of the home or who contributes the largest part of the economic resources of the home, or in the last instance, is the oldest. In non family groups the head can be one who has the most authority, the oldest person, the person who has resided in the dwelling the longest or the one who administers the place. For all cases, the head should be a usual resident older than 15 years. Kenya 1999 There are several persons who are not related by blood or marriage but constitute a household, mostly in urban areas. Without telling them code one of them as 'head,' (code 1) and the rest as 'non-relative' (code 8)...Sometimes it might happen that members of the household are away and cannot be reached even after three visits, and the most responsible person you meet is a house help or any other such person employed by the household. You must probe to establish the most senior member who will have spent the census night in the household. This person must be made the household head.
Mexico 1960
Make an X on the line of the head of family, whoever they may be (father, mother, older brother, etc.)...
Mexico 1970
Write the first and last name of the head of family, who can be a man or a woman...
Mexico 1990
Remember that the head of household or group is a person who normally lives in the dwelling, and is known as the head of household by the members of the family or group.
Mexico 2000 ...there should only be one head of family and that this person can be a man or a woman...
Philippines 1990
You begin to ascertain the members of the household by asking the respondent: "Who is the head of this household?" Write the name of this person on the first line.
Philippines 1995 and 2000
Begin by asking the respondent: "Who is the head of this household?" Write the name of this person on the first line.
Romania 1992 and 2002 ...A person who has left the household for a long period of time...to work, study, or for other reasons..., is generally not considered to be the head of the household...when a person lives alone and is not included in any household, record this person as a code 01 -the head of the household, because it is considered as forming a one-person household.
South Africa 1996 It depends upon respondents to nominate the head of the household and no guidelines were provided on the questionnaire as to who this should be. The interviewer's instructions defined head of household as "a male or a female who assumes responsiblity for the household."
South Africa 2001
The head was defined as the main decision-maker, or the person who owned or rented the dwelling, or the person who was the main breadwinner, or chosen by the household. The head could be either male or female. If two people were equal decision-makers, or in a household of totally unrelated persons, the older or oldest could be named as the household head.
Uganda 1991 ...where several persons who are not related are living in a household, name one as head and describe the rest as "other."
Uganda 2002
Ask, "who is the head of this household?"
Venezuela 1971 Head of household: write down head for the person considered as such by the members of the household for reasons of relationship, age, authority, or respect.
Venezuela 1981 Head of household: a member of the household, man or woman, who the other members of the household consider to be the head. This may be for reasons of dependence, relationship, age, authority, or respect. If no member of the household is considered the head, then choose the oldest...in the case of a dwelling made up entirely of persons not related to each other, the person considered to be the "head" is written down as such and the other residents are considered "non-relatives."
Venezuela 1990 A member of the Household, man or woman, who the other members of the household consider the head. This may be for reasons of dependence, relationship, age, authority, or respect. If no member of the Household is considered the head then choose the oldest.
Vietnam 1989 Household head is the person who represents a household and all of household members recognize that person as a head of household. (p174)...Household head or the person who is in charge of answering the census is recorded in line 1 of the household roaster...Before filling out name of household head, the interviewer should check if the person who is in the line for "name of household head" is in the enumeration coverage. if that person is not in the enumeration coverage (already moved to other place, policeman, in army, etc), the oldest person in the household can be considered as a household head.
Vietnam 1999 Head of household is the person who represents household and all other household member recognize. If a household has all children, their father and mother are policemen or in army (they are enumerated separately), household head is the oldest child. Students who live in dormitory or rent an apartment are enumerated as a single household unit. Head of household is the person who are recognized by other members in the apartment. Other members would have "other" relationship with the head.
Source: Minnesota Population Center (2007).
